Producers, parasites and poverty traps  by de Carvalho Griebeler, Marcelo & Hillbrecht, Ronald Otto
Available  online  at  www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
HOSTED BY
EconomiA 16 (2015) 310–320
Producers, parasites and poverty traps
Marcelo de Carvalho Griebeler a,∗, Ronald Otto Hillbrecht b
a Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas, Av. João Pessoa, 52 sala 23 – 3◦ andar, Centro, Porto Alegre,
RS 90040-000, Brazil
b Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Faculdade de Ciências Econômicas, Av. João Pessoa, 52 sala 33 – 3◦ andar, Centro, Porto Alegre,
RS 90040-000, Brazil
Received 4 March 2015; received in revised form 27 July 2015; accepted 31 July 2015
Available online 27 October 2015
Abstract
We studied the population dynamics of producers and parasites in a developing economy through the Lotka–Volterra model. Our
baseline model found a cyclical equilibrium between these two groups of agents. When the equilibrium output is low, we propose
that economy is in a poverty trap, such that the only way to achieve superior equilibrium is through improvements in the institutional
parameters (e.g. property rights). By adding expectations and time delays, the cyclical result may no longer hold. Nevertheless,
institutional improvements promote development through an increase in the level of producers and a decrease of parasites. Still,
such improvements positively affect the stability of the modified model.
© 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
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Resumo
Estudamos a dinâmica populacional de produtores e parasitas em uma economia em desenvolvimento através do modelo de Lotka-
Volterra. Nosso modelo base encontra um equilíbrio cíclico entre esses dois grupos de agentes. Quando o produto de equilíbrio é
baixo, estabelecemos que a economia está em uma armadilha de pobreza, tal que o único meio de alcanc¸ar um equilíbrio superior é
através de melhora nos parâmetros institucionais (p.e. direitos de propriedade). Ao adicionar expectativas e defasagem temporal, o
resultado cíclico pode deixar de existir. De todo modo, melhoras institucionais promovem desenvolvimento através de um aumento
no nível de produtores e um decréscimo no de parasitas. Além disso, tais melhoras afetam positivamente a estabilidade do equilíbrio
do modelo modificado.
© 2015 National Association of Postgraduate Centers in Economics, ANPEC. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights
reserved.
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.  Introduction
Developing economies have in common the presence of a large number of unproductive businesses, which are
nanced by and survive at the expense of productive activities. These type of parasitic activities assume several forms,
uch as violent criminal organizations and gangs affiliated with corrupt politicians. Although parasites do not produce,
hey have the same objective as a regular firm, namely profit. Economic consequences of parasitic activities may be
ery serious, such that it is possible that it could result in an economy falling into a poverty trap (Mehlum et al., 2003a).
The following parasitic behavior is quite typical: on the one hand, they provide protection and enforce contracts of
mall businesses, but on the other hand the “price” of these services is charged through extortion. This is the well known
odus operandi  of mafia: problem solving, which should be a state responsibility, is handled by violent groups that
xtort the agents.1 Although it is possible to find examples of such groups in developed countries (e.g. Sicilian mafia),
he presence of parasites is more common in developing nations (see Campos, 2000 for eastern European economies
n transition in general, Volkov, 2002 for Russia and Naím, 2006 for Latin American countries, for example).2
The aim of this paper is to model the population dynamics of producers and parasites in a developing economy. In
rder to do so, we use the Lotka–Volterra model, which describes the evolution over time of populations of predator
nd prey. The idea is to treat producers as prey and parasites as predators. Our baseline model finds cyclical equilibrium
etween these two groups of agents. When the equilibrium output is low, we claim that the economy is in a poverty trap,
uch that the only way to achieve a superior equilibrium is through improvements in the institutional parameters (e.g.
roperty rights). By adding expectations and time delays, the cyclical result no longer holds. Nevertheless, institutional
mprovements promote development through an increase in the level of producers and a decrease of parasites. Still,
uch improvements positively affects the stability of the modified model.
Our paper contributes to the literature on economic development that considers the institutional environment and
ts influence on the economic growth (e.g. Besley and Ghatak, 2010; Mehlum et al., 2003a,b; Grossman, 1998) by
tressing the importance of parameters like property rights and law enforcement, for example. Concerning to the use
f Lotka–Volterra model in Economics, we follow the tradition of seminal paper by Goodwin (1967). Among its many
xtensions (e.g. Desai, 1973; van der Ploeg, 1988; Sportelli, 1995), one of the most innovative is Vadasz (2007), which
ncorporates time lag (and expectations) in the economy’s dynamics in order to consider informational failure in the
odel. Because of this desirable feature, we adopt in our modified model the same framework as proposed by the latter
uthor.
This paper is divided into two sections, besides this introduction. Section 2 presents the baseline model of producer
nd parasite dynamics as well as the modified one, which includes a time lag, and studies the stability of the found
quilibria. Section 3 concludes by presenting the possibility of identifying a poverty trap and how it is possible to
vercome it. Our findings also provide some policy implications, discussed in this section. Appendix A shows the
roofs omitted from the text.
.  The  dynamics  of  producers  and  parasites
.1.  The  baseline  model
Let us consider a developing economy where two types of agents, producers, and parasites exist. Producers include
ndividuals and firms that engage in legal productive activities, which make the economy’s output grow. These agents
re the only ones that are productive. We make the simplifying assumption that all producers are identical and each
ne produces only one unit of output, such that the economy’s aggregate output is equal to producers’ number. We also
ssume that there is no barrier to entry and exit, and the market for factors is able to meet producers’ demand without
ffecting their cost.
1 It is important to stress that, based on the above definitions, the appropriation of income made by this group is different from regular rent-seeking.
uch agents capture income in a direct manner from an active – and usually large – state through regulation of private business, for example. On the
ther hand, parasitic action takes advantage of gaps due to an absence or weakness of the state.
2 In order to have an idea of economic consequences of parasitic action, let us analyse the case of piracy, one of the most widespread activities
f this sector. According Naím (2006), U.S. companies, for instance, estimate a loss of revenues due to falsification between 200 and 250 billion
ollars. Furthermore, the European Union has reported that the cost due to illegal copies, in terms of lost jobs, may achieve 100 thousand.
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On the other hand, parasites are those agents defined in the introduction, which exist due only to poorly-defined or
non-existent property rights. Such agents appropriate part of the producers output and “feed” their business through
extortion and other illegal means. As cited above, parasites do not perform productive activities; therefore, their output
is null. We assume that their cost is null and there is no barrier to entry and exit. Thus, the dynamics of these populations
in the economy can be described by the system
x˙  =  α1x  −  γ1xy  (2.1)
y˙ =  θ1xy  −  β1y,  (2.2)
where x  is the density of producers in the economy, y  is the density of parasites, α1 is the producers’ profit rate, β1
is the rate of parasite extinction (due to state’s actions and its police power), γ1 is the rate of producer extinction
due to parasite extortion (a parameter that measures how much productive agents are sensitive to illegal activity from
parasites) and θ1 is the rate of conversion of extortion into more parasites (how much extortion is used to increase
unproductive industry; the profit rate of parasite activity is a good proxy). All parameters are positive and constant.3
Eq. (2.1) illustrates that the number of producers in the economy increases as their profit rate (α1) increases, because
attracts more firms and individuals to productive activities. Rather, the number of producers decreases as sensitivity to
parasite extortion (γ1) is higher, given that it stimulates agents to leave their businesses. Similarly, Eq. (2.2) indicates
that the parasite population increases as its profit rate (θ1) increases by attracting new agents to this group. Furthermore,
an improvement in state’s police power (an increase in β1) decreases the number of parasites.
Let us now investigate the role of two of the parameters in the model’s dynamics. It is easy to verify in the system
(2.1) and (2.2) that, in absence of parasites, producer populations grows exponentially at constant rate α1 > 0; and, in
the absence of producers, parasite populations decrease exponentially until extinction at a constant rate β1 > 0. This
result is intuitive to the extent that we know the dynamics between the two sectors: in absence of a group that extorts
part of its income, the number of producers will increase without limits; and in absence of producers, parasites do not
find a means to “feed” their activities and survive, such that they vanish from the economy.
2.2.  Equilibrium  and  stability  of  the  system
Proposition below shows that two equilibria exist in (2.1) and (2.2).4
Proposition  2.1.  Consider  the  system  (2.1) and (2.2). Then,  we  have  the  following  equilibria,  E1 = {x  = 0, y = 0} and
E2 = {x  = β1/θ1, y = α1/γ1}.
The first equilibrium represents an extinction of both groups. With an absence of producers and parasites, the
economy will stay indefinitely so. The second equilibrium represents a point at which both producers and parasites
maintain the size of their populations – in a positive number – and, in the absence of shocks, it will stay indefinitely
so. As shown in the dynamic system (2.1) and (2.2), the level of each population depends exclusively on exogenous
parameters.
After identifying the equilibria, we must see how deviations from these points caused by exogenous shocks affect
the model’s dynamics. Proposition 2.2 deals with the stability of the origin.
Proposition 2.2.  The  equilibrium  E1 = {x  = 0, y  = 0}  of  the  system  (2.1) and (2.2) is  a  saddle  point.
Although in equilibrium this point is of little interest, because both groups are absent, it is important to study its
stability. Note that if such equilibrium was stable, populations in positive numbers might be attracted to it, such that the
dynamics of the model would cause extinction of both producers and parasites for many initial levels of a population.
However, given that it is a saddle point, extinction is an uncommon result in our model. In fact, the only possibility for3 Observe that the economically relevant state space of our model is R2+, different from one studied by Goodwin (1967), which is{
(x, y) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
}
.
4 Because of the economic interpretation, we chose to call a solution of the system (2.1) and (2.2) when x˙ = y˙ = 0 an equilibrium, instead of a
fixed point.
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xtinction would be if producers were artificially eradicated, such that parasites would not have anyone to extort and
o would disappear as well.
roposition  2.3.  The  equilibrium  E2 = {x  = β1/θ1, y  = α1/γ1}  of  the  system  (2.1) and (2.2) is  not  hyperbolic,  that  is,
t is  neither  stable  nor  unstable.
Given that the eigenvalues of the Jacobian evaluated in E2 are purely imaginary (see Appendix A), one may not
onclude anything through linear analysis. However, the proposition below provides an auxiliary result in understanding
he dynamics in the equilibrium’s neighborhood.
roposition  2.4.  The  system  (2.1) and (2.2) moves  in  closed  orbits.  In  addition,  it  admits  a constant  of  motion
 = xβ1yα1e−θ1x−γ1y.
Proposition 2.4 states that the levels of producer and parasite populations oscillate cyclically around equilibrium
2 = (β1/θ1, α1/γ1). Intuitively, what the result states is that the cycle’s length depends on the initial number of each
roup as well as the values of exogenous parameters.
Therefore, the cyclical dynamics of our model works in the following way: the number of parasites increases
henever there is a large number of producers to be extorted, but by extorting they encourage productive agents to
uit their business and so the possibilities of extortion decrease, making their our population declines. Thus, parasite
opulations decrease, making the number of producers increase again. This dynamics results in a cycle of growth and
ecline of both groups.
.3.  The  modiﬁed  model:  adding  expectations  and  bounding  the  number  of  producers
The baseline model assumes that, in the absence of parasites, the producer population increases exponentially toward
nfinity at a constant rate. This means that output would grow infinitely. Furthermore, such an assumption implies that
he entry rate of new producers in the economy is not affected by the number of agents already established. In other
ords, in this case it is necessary a demand which is increasing at the same rate, such that every new producer may
ell his production. Thus, the profitability of productive sector is independent of the number of productive agents.
In order to overcome the above difficulty and add more reality to our model, we assume that producer populations
row according to a logistic function (saturation). Formally, we have now5
x˙  =  α2
(
1 − x
K
)
x −  γ2xy.
t well known that the solution of the above equation, in the absence of parasites, is given by
x  = Kx0e
α2t
K  +  x0(eα2t −  1) ,
here K  is a positive constant and x0 is the initial producer population.
We can easily verify that, in the absence of parasites, x  is increasing (decreasing) over time if the initial producer
opulation is lower (greater) than K. Furthermore, in both cases, the solutions tend to K as time goes to infinity. Observe
hat now the number of producers already established affects the attractiveness of the sector. If, for instance, in an
conomy without parasites, excessive initial number of producers exist (K  < x0), the variation in their population will
e negative, indicating that there is excess of supply in the economy, what decreases sector’s attractiveness.
The second modification adds lag in the relation between producers and parasites. An increase in the number of
arasites does not have an instantaneous effect on producers’ number and vice-versa. Indeed, there exists a lag between
he increase in one population and the perception and response of another. For example, potential parasites recognize
he increase in the number of producers – and thus a greater availability of targets for extortion – after some time, and
nly after that, they decide whether to entry into the sector. This lag may be caused by the fact that some productive
5 Definitions of parameters α2 and γ2 are the same as those of α1 and γ1 in the baseline model, respectively. We chose to change the subscripts
n order to highlight the different population dynamics in the two models.
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activities are not instantly measurable,6 for example. Specifically, we assume that the parasite sector has less available
information – maybe due to its level of organization, given they are composed of illegal activities, in general – than
productive one, such that the response of its population to changes in producer numbers is not instantaneous.
The lag above described may be modeled by adding in Eq. (2.2) a weight function that takes into account past
movements in producer populations. Formally, we replace x  in Eq. (2.2) by
z  =
∫ t
0
x(τ)G(t  −  τ)dτ  (2.3)
where G(·) is the weight function, which is non negative and integrable, with the property of ∫ t−∞ G(t  −  τ)dτ  =∫∞
0 G(s)ds  =  1.
An alternative suggested by the literature (e.g. Farkas, 1984; Vadasz, 2007) is to study the system with the following
weight function G(s) = G1(s) = φ2e−φ2s, φ2 > 0. This function assumes a discount 1/φ2 in the parasites’ response to
changes in the number of producers. In addition, function G  has the desirable feature of giving less weight to levels of
producers’ population which occurred in the distant past (large s), such that they have a lower effect on the parasites’
population than recent ones. In the limit, as s goes to infinity, the effect is null.
By replacing G into (2.3), we have a new system:
x˙  =  α2
(
1 − x
K
)
x −  γ2xy
y˙  =  θ2y
∫ t
0
x(τ)φ2e−φ2(t−τ)dτ  −  β2y,
which is equivalent to (see Farkas, 1984)
x˙  =  α2
(
1 − x
K
)
x −  γ2xy  (2.4)
y˙ =  θ2yz  −  β2y (2.5)
z˙ =  φ2(x  −  z).  (2.6)
The economic interpretation of our new system is simple and more realistic than the baseline model: parasites no
longer react to current levels of producer populations; now they form expectations about future levels based on the past
before acting. Still, their expectations changes and are continually updated, as expressed by (2.6) in the above system.
2.4.  Stability  and  equilibrium  of  the  modiﬁed  system
Our modified model presents one additional equilibrium.
Proposition 2.5.  Consider  the  system  (2.4)–(2.6). Then,  we  have  the  following  equilibria,  E3 = {x  = 0, y = 0, z  = 0},
E4 = {x  = K, y = 0, z = K}  and  E5 = {x  = β2/θ2, y  = α2/γ2(1 −  (β2/θ2K)), z = β2/θ2}.
Regarding the economic interpretation, we have the trivial equilibrium E3 = (0, 0, 0), with absence of both producers
and parasites; E4 = (K, 0, K), in which the economy achieves the maximal number of producers, K, and minimal
(absence) of parasites; and E5 = [β2/θ2, α2/γ2(1 −  (β2/θ2K)), β2/θ2], with both populations in a positive number, since
that β2 < θ2K. Recall that variable z  only has an auxiliary role, being strictly technical. Moreover, observe that values
of equilibrium are independent of the intertemporal discount rate φ2.
The equilibrium corresponding to the origin continues to be unstable (see Appendix A), which ensures that, when
one starts in an environment with both populations in positive numbers, there is no possibility of extinction.Proposition 2.6.  The  equilibrium  E3 = {x  = 0, y  = 0, z = 0}  of  the  system  (2.4)–(2.6) is  a saddle  point.
6 Another possible cause is informational failures; something common in developing economies.
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Now we can see that the other equilibria do not show cyclical behavior.
roposition  2.7.  Consider  the  equilibrium  E4 = {x  = K, y  = 0, z  = K}  of  the  system  (2.4)–(2.6). With  respect  to  its
tability we  have:  (i)  if  β2 > θ2K,  then  E4 is  asymptotically  stable;  and  (ii)  if  β2 < θ2K,  then  E4 is  unstable.
What is relevant to observe in Proposition 2.7 is that β2 > θ2K  is a sufficient condition to stability.7 In other words, if
he state’s power to combat parasitic activity is high enough relative to profit rate of the illegal sector, weighted by the
umber of producers, we will have stability of E4. This fact is explained by E4 being an equilibrium in which producers
re in maximal number and parasites do not exist, such that police power must be very strong – or the parasite’s profit
ate must be very low – in order for this situation to remain stable.
Equilibrium E5 is of interest to us by presenting positive numbers for both populations.
roposition 2.8.  Consider  the  equilibrium  E5 = {x  = β2/θ2, y = α2/γ2(1 −  (β2/θ2K)), z  = β2/θ2}  of  the  system
2.4)–(2.6).  With  respect  to  its  stability  we  have:  (i)  if β2 < θ2K,  then  E5 is  asymptotically  stable;  and  (ii)  if  β2 > θ2K,
hen E5 is  unstable.
Now we have a positive number for both populations, such that enforcement power cannot be too strong, otherwise
arasites would be extinct (β2 = θ2K, for example). In other words, the parasite’s profit rate, weighted by the number
f potential prey, must be high relative to enforcement power in order for parasites to remain in a positive number.
.  Policy  implications  and  poverty  traps
A direct conclusion from Section 2.2 (from Proposition 2.3, in particular) is that a developing economy, once in
quilibrium, is not able to grow continuously. Such a situation may be considered a poverty trap.
eﬁnition 3.1.  We say that an equilibrium Ei is a poverty trap whenever it is characterized by low output and the
conomy by itself (endogenously) is not able to overcome it. Moreover, deviations from Ei cause a cyclical behavior
round it.
Observe that we define a poverty trap slightly different than the literature (e.g. Azariadis and Stachurski, 2005): there
s an upper bound that the economy’s output must not surpass; and the output presents cyclical behavior. Therefore,
he equilibrium E2 = (β1/θ1, α1/γ1) may be considered a poverty trap, depending on its parameter values.
It is well documented that developing countries present values for α1, β1, γ1 and θ1 which often lead to a poverty
rap. For example, they present weak property rights, reflected in high values of γ1 and θ1. However, the main parameter
o be affected by their bad institutions is β1, the rate of parasite extinction, because states’ actions are ineffective and
heir police power is weak. Thus, β1/θ1 is low in these countries, such that E2 may be characterized as a poverty trap.
A direct implication of Definition 3.1 is that the state may promote growth by improving its police power, β1, and
hrough other actions that decrease the profit rate of parasite activity, θ1.
orollary 3.2.  Consider  a  economy  represented  by  the  system  (2.1) and (2.2). Assume  that  its  equilibrium  output
s (β1/θ1) < M,  where  M  is  the  output  level  which  deﬁnes  a  poverty  trap  for  this  economy.  Furthermore,  assume  that
he producers’  proﬁt  rate  and  the  rate  of  conversion  of  extortion  into  more  parasites  are  ﬁxed.  Then,  the  only  way  to
vercome the  poverty  trap  is  by  institutional  improvement,  by  increasing  the  protection  of  property  rights  and  police
ower.
Although in marginally different versions, Corollary 3.2 is well established in the literature. In fact, Acemoglu and
obinson (2010) and Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), among others, identify different types of traps.8 The above
tatement is rather strong by putting in the hands of the state all the responsibility for the development. However, our7 We excluded from the analysis of Propositions 2.7 and 2.8 the case β2 = θ2K. One can use expressions (A.7) and (A.9) to conclude that, in this
ase, in both equilibria we would have eigenvalues with null real part, such that the Hartman–Grobman theorem does not apply.
8 Acemoglu and Robinson (2010) uses the term “pitfall”.
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basic model captures a crucial aspect of growth, relegated in many development theories: the creation – or improvement
– of incentives for truly productive activities and the effort to inhibit those activities which do not aggregate value –
and, in our model, even disaggregate. The main contribution of the Lotka–Volterra model is to provide the perception
that whenever an incentive is created, it may affect both producers and parasites.
Good institutions may have another important impact on the overcoming of poverty traps: they may make the
economy move away the cyclical equilibria by destroying the closed orbits. Given that one of the equilibria of system
(2.1) and (2.2) is not hyperbolic, the associated model presents structural instability. This instability means that
very small perturbations in the vector field may lead to qualitatively different behaviors. Thus, since institutional
improvement may cause such perturbations in the vector field of our system, one possibility is that, for γ1 high enough,
such an improvement causes parasite extinction.
In the modified model (2.4)–(2.6) there may not be poverty trap, because all equilibria are hyperbolic. In fact,
Definition 3.1 does not exclude the possibility of existence of periodic orbits around equilibria of the modified system.
For example, if we are able to find a compact region of the x  −  y  −  z  space, and a trajectory of the dynamical system
such that it remains in this region for all t  > 0, then Poincaré–Bendixson theorem applies,9 and this trajectory possibly
is a closed orbit or approaches a closed orbit. Thus, for K  and β2/θ2 low enough, equilibria E4 and E5, respectively,
may satisfy Definition 3.1 and be considered poverty traps. However, such a possibility depends on the parameters’
values, and it may not be straightforward to find the aforementioned compact region.
Despite that difference, improvements in the institutional variables in the system (2.4)–(2.6) have a effect on the
economic growth similar to one of the baseline model. Equilibrium E5 = (β2/θ2, α2/γ2(1 −  (β2/θ2K)), β2/θ2), for
example, presents higher output (number of productive agents) and lower number of parasites as β2 increases. Still,
an improvement in the police power (higher γ2) decreases the number of parasites. However, there is a bound for the
institutional improvement, given that β2 > θ2K  implies in negative number of parasites. Even if we considered this
situation possible, the equilibrium would become unstable. In fact, as Propositions 2.7 and 2.8 show, these parameters
affect stability of equilibria. For instance, although E4 = (K,  0,  K) is not directly affected, an institutional improvement
may make it stable for higher values of K.
We conclude with two observations. First, our results do not change when the profit of both activities are endogenous.
In order to see this, assume that α(x) and θ(y) are functions of their respective populations. We can assume that profits
decrease as activities become more competitive, such that. Then, a positive shock in x  implies a decrease of α(x). It
turns out that this causes two effects: a direct one, because the decrease in the profit rate makes some producers leave
the sector; and an indirect effect, because with a larger number of potential targets, the number of parasites increases.
This latter effect makes θ(y) decrease and the cyclical dynamics restarts.
Second, we implicitly assume that the state can choose the values of β  and γ  without any budget constraint.
Obviously, improvements in police power cost money, such that we can conjecture how our findings would change
with the inclusion of such constraints. In this case, the state would have two roles: on the one hand it would extract
income (a share of the output) of the productive sector in the form of taxes; on the other hand, it would restrain parasitic
activity by means of the police. Thus, the state would act both as “producer”, by promoting growth, and as a parasite,
by taxing people in order to finance its actions. The dominant effect probably would depend on the specific economy
in study.
Appendix  A.  Omitted  proofs
Proof  of  Proposition  2.1.  In equilibrium there is no change in both populations, such that x˙  =  y˙ =  0. Then, the
system (2.1) and (2.2) becomes
0 =  x(α1 −  γ1y)
0 =  y(θ1x −  β1),
which has solutions {x  = 0, y  = 0}  and {x  = β1/θ1, y  = α1/γ1}. 
9 Although Poincaré–Bendixson theorem applies only to continuous dynamical systems on the plane, we can invoke it because our three dimensional
system (2.4)–(2.6) is equivalent to one of two variables (Farkas, 1984).
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roof  of  Proposition  2.2.  The Jacobian of the system (2.1) and (2.2) is
J1(x,  y) =
[
α1 −  γ1y  −γ1x
θ1y θ1x −  β1
]
.
hus, we have
J1(0,  0) =
[
α1 0
0 −β1
]
,
hich has eigenvalues λ1 = α1 and λ2 = −  β1. Given that α1, β1 > 0, we have (0, 0) is a saddle point. 
roof of  Proposition  2.3.  By evaluating J1 in (β1/θ1, α1/γ1) we have
J1
(
β1
θ1
,
α1
γ1
)
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
0 −γ1β1
θ1
θ1α1
γ1
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
hose eigenvalues are λ  =  ±i√α1β1. Purely imaginary eigenvalues imply that the point is not hyperbolic. 
roof of  Proposition  2.4.  In order to show that the system (2.1) and (2.2) has closed orbits, we must find a function
hich is constant in any path and show that it is strictly monotone over the ray starting in an equilibrium point and
ncreasing in the northeast direction of the plane producer-parasite. To understand the above reasoning, suppose we
ave a such function f and consider a path starting in a point a  of a ray, making a full turn around the equilibrium and
chieving another point b  of the ray. Given that f is constant in the path, f(a) = f(b). However, f is monotone in the ray,
uch that a  = b, which characterizes a closed orbit.
First, we divide both sides of (2.1) and (2.2) by x  and y, respectively. Thus, we obtain
x˙
x
= α1 −  γ1y  (A.1)
y˙
y
= θ1x −  β1. (A.2)
By dividing (A.1) by (A.2) we have
y
x
x˙
y˙
= α1 −  γ1y
θ1x  −  β1 .
After some algebraic operations, the resulting expression is
(θ1x −  β1)
x
x˙  = (α1 −  γ1y)
y
y˙.  (A.3)
It is possible to note that (A.3) is equivalent to
d
dt
(θ1x −  β1 ln x) = d
dt
(α1 ln y  −  γ1y).  (A.4)
Now, by integrating both sides of (A.4),∫
d
dt
(θ1x  −  β1 ln x)dt  =
∫
d
dt
(α1 ln y  −  γ1y)dt
A +  θ1x −  β1 ln x =  α1 ln y −  γ1y,
here A  is the constant of integration.
Finally, the constant of motion can be obtained by taking the exponential of both sides and rearranging the terms
C  =  xβ1yα1e−(θ1x+γ1y),  (A.5)
here C  = eA.
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For the second part of the proof, consider a ray (x, y) starting in the equilibrium (β1/θ1, α1/γ1) and moving in the
northeast direction. We can write x = (β1/θ1)s, y = (α1/γ1)s, where s is a parameter which measures the distance from
the equilibrium. Thus, if s  = 1, (x, y) = (β1/θ1, α1/γ1). By substituting it into (A.5) we have(
β1
θ1
)β1(α1
γ1
)α1
sα1+β1e−s(α1+β1) =  C.
Now, by rearranging the terms and taking the (α1 + β1)th root of both sides,
se−s =  D,  (A.6)
where D  = C(1/(α1+β1)(θ1/β1)(β1/α1+β1)(γ1/α1)(α1/α1+β1).
If we show that the left-hand of (A.6) is strictly monotone for s  > 1, then any s  > 1 which satisfies (A.6) is unique.
Thus, by taking the derivative of the left-hand we have
e−s −  se−s =  (1 −  s)e−s,
which is strictly negative for s  > 1. This completes the proof. 
Proof of  Proposition  2.5.  Equilibrium requires x˙  =  y˙ =  z˙  =  0, such that the system (2.4)–(2.6) becomes
0 =  x
(
α2 − α2x
K
−  γ2y
)
0 =  y(θ2z −  β2)
0 =  φ1(x  −  z).
Now it is possible to see that the solutions are {x  = 0, y  = 0, z = 0}, {x  = K, y  = 0, z = K}  and {x  = β2/θ2,
y = α2/γ2(1 −  (β2/θ2K)), z  = β2/θ2}. 
Proof of  Proposition  2.6.  The Jacobian of the system (2.4)–(2.6) is given by
J2(x,  y,  z) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
α2
(
1 − 2x
K
)
−  γ2y −γ2x  0
0 θ2z  −  β2 θ2y
φ2 0 −φ2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
By evaluating J2 in (0, 0, 0) we have
J2(0,  0,  0) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
α2 0 0
0 −β2 0
φ2 0 −φ2
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ ,
which provides directly its eigenvalues: λ1 = α2, λ2 = −  β2 and λ3 = −  φ2. Because α2, β2, φ2 > 0, (0, 0, 0) is a saddle
point. 
Theorem  A.1  (Descartes’ rule of signs). The  number  of  positive  roots  in  a polynomial  equation  p(x) with  real
coefﬁcients is  never  higher  than  the  number  of  sign  changes  T  in  the  sequence  of  its  non-zero  coefﬁcients,  and  if
it is  lower,  then  always  it  is  an  even  number.
Proof  of  Proposition  2.7.  The Jacobian of the system (2.4)–(2.6) evaluated in the equilibrium (K, 0, K) is
J2(K,  0,  K) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
−α2 −γ2K  0
0 θ2K  −  β2 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ .φ2 0 −φ2
The characteristic polynomial of J2(K, 0, K) is then
−λ3 −  λ2(α2 +  φ2 +  β2 −  θ2K) −  λ[α2φ2 +  (α2 +  φ2)(β2 −  θ2K)] +  α2φ2(θ2K  −  β2).  (A.7)
ot
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o
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For the item (i), we can apply Theorem A.1 in order to show that β2 > θ2K  is a sufficient condition for (A.7) to have
nly negative roots. For, consider the following notation for (A.7): a0λ3 + a1λ2 + a2λ + a3. Note that if ai < 0 for all i,
hen (A.7) does not change sign – presents the following sequence (−  , −  , −  , −) –, and, by Theorem A.1, it has no
ositive roots.
As a0 = −1 < 0, we must show that β2 > θ2K  implies a1, a2, a3 < 0. Given that α2 + φ2 > 0, for
1 = −  (α2 + φ2 + β2 −  θ2K) < 0 it suffices that β2 > θ2K. For a2 = −  [α2φ2 + (α2 + φ2)(β2 −  θ2K)] < 0, we also have
2φ2 > 0, such that β2 > θ2K  is sufficient. Finally, for a3 = α2φ2(θ2K  −  β2) < 0, we once again require that θ2K < β2.
hus, β2 > θ2K  is a sufficient condition for the existence of only positive real roots in (A.7).
We still have to obtain conditions for (A.7) to have only negative real roots. Observe that by replacing λ by (−  λ)
n (A.7) we have
λ3 −  λ2(α2 +  φ2 +  β2 −  θ2K) +  λ[α2φ2 +  (α2 +  φ2)(β2 −  θ2K)] +  α2φ2(θ2K  −  β2). (A.8)
By assuming β2 > θ2K, we have that (A.8) changes signs three times – presents the sequence (−  , + , −  , +). Therefore,
heorem A.1 implies that (A.7) has three, two or no negative real root. As two or none are impossible options – complex
oots occur in conjugate pairs –, we have that (A.7) only has negative real roots. Thus, we conclude that β2 > θ2K is a
ufficient condition for the stability of the system (2.4)–(2.6).
To prove (ii), notice that, if β2 < θ2K, then a3 = α2φ2(θ2K  −  β2) > 0 in both (A.7) and (A.8). As a0 > 0 in (A.8), that
olynomial may change signs either twice [either (+ , + , −  , +) or (+ , −  , + , +)] or not at all [(+ , + , + , +)]. By applying
heorem A.1, we have that, in the first possibility (A.7) has two or no negative real roots and; in the second possibility,
o negative real root. In any case, it is impossible to have three negative real roots or one negative real and two complex
ith negative real part, cases that would ensure the stability. This proves (ii). 
roof of  Proposition  2.8.  The Jacobian of (2.4)–(2.6) evaluated in E5 is
J2
(
β2
θ2
,
α2
γ2
(
1 − β2
θ2K
)
,
β2
θ2
)
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
−α2β2
θ2K
−γ2β2
θ2
0
0 0
θ2α2
γ2
(
1 − β2
θ2K
)
φ2 0 −φ2
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
By calculating the determinant of J2(β2/θ2, α2/γ2(1 −  (β2/θ2K)), β2/θ2) − λI  we have
−λ3 −  λ2
(
φ2 + α2β2
θ2K
)
−  λ
(
α2β2φ2
θ2K
)
+  α2β2φ2
(
β2
θ2K
−  1
)
. (A.9)
To prove (i) and (ii) we use the notation a0λ3 + a1λ2 + a2λ + a3 for (A.9). Firstly, consider that β2 < θ2K. Then,
3 = α2β2φ2((β2/θ2K) −  1) < 0 and we have no sign change in (A.9), because a0 = −1 < 0, a1 = −  (φ2 + (α2β2/θ2K)) < 0
nd a2 = −  (α2β2φ2/θ2K) < 0. By Theorem A.1, therefore, (A.9) has no positive real root.
By substituting λ by (−  λ) into (A.9) we have
λ3 −  λ2
(
φ2 + α2β2
θ2K
)
+  λ
(
α2β2φ2
θ2K
)
+  α2β2φ2
(
β2
θ2K
−  1
)
, (A.10)
hich presents three sign changes [(+ , −  , + , −)], which means that (A.9) has three, two or no negative real root,
here we use Theorem A.1. Because complex roots occur in pairs, the only possibility is one of three negative real
oots. This proves stability.
Now consider that β2 > θ2K. This makes a3 = α2β2φ2((β2/θ2K) −  1) > 0 in both (A.9) and (A.10). Observe that in
A.10) we have two sign changes [(+ , −  , + , +)], which makes (A.9) have two or no negative real root. In both cases,
ne root is positive and real, such that the system (2.4)–(2.6) is unstable. This proves (ii). 
roof of  Corollary  3.2.  It follows directly from Proposition 2.4 and Definition 3.1. 
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